COMPANY B 2D BATTALION (MECH) 22D INFANTRY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268
AVDCTV-B 5 June 1969
SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report (Transcribed from Original)
2d Bn (M) 22d Inf
1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION: B Company, 2nd Battalion (Mech),
22d Infantry, operations-battalion size through the Ben Cui and Crescent areas.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 12, 13, & 14 May 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ben Cui and Crescent areas adjacent to Dau Tieng.
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: B Company, 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: CPT Eugene J. Johnston, B Company, 2d Battalion (Mech)
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Control Headquarters, Battalion Headquarters, 2d Bat-
talion (Mech) 22d Infantry. Units participating: all combat elements of the
2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: One Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (Dau Tieng),
one Battery, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (Dau Tieng), air to ground support
by Air Force (Issue), and Army Gun-ships.
8. INTELLIGENCE: Agent reports indicated probable enemy occupation of the
Crescent areas northwest of Dau Tieng.
9. MISSION: S3 planning included emphasis upon the Crescent areas north-
west of Dau Tieng; objectives were placed strategically in order to recon-
noiter all possible areas of danger and enemy occupation.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The concept of the operation included all com-
bat elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry, in joint effort to lo-
cate an enemy force of unknown size. This enemy force had been effectively
deterred from making an attack on the Dau Tieng convoy on 12 May 1969, but
had held at first two mechanized infantry companies and later three in con-
tact throughout the day.
AVDCTV-B 5 June 1969|
SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report (Con't)
11. EXECUTION: On 12 May 1969, the first of three days of contact, Bravo
Company, after terminating a mission in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, re-
acted to a two (2) company size contact in the vicinity of check-point 108.
Upon arriving at the area of contact, Bravo Company assumed the right flank
of a three company line formation which moved west through the Ben Cui “Ar-
row-head”. Bravo Company remained in this position for a approximately one and
one half hours-bringing into use indirect fire support from Dau Tieng and
gunship support from Cu Chi.
On the second day of contact, the combat elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech)
22d Infantry were jointly conducting a reconnaissance in force mission through
the Crescent area northwest of Dau Tieng. The Battalion assume a “Box-type”
formation with Alpha and Charlie Company leading, and Bravo and Recon trail-
ing. At approximately 1345 hours, the combined elements were moving through
a heavily vegetated woodline: at this time, the lead elements received heavy
RPG and automatic weapons fire from the front and flank. The Battalion then
adjusted formation to include Alpha and Charlie taking a line stance against
the forward contact and Bravo Company and Recon holding the flank. Indirect
fire support was immediately employed from Dau Tieng. The ensuing fire-fight
lasted approximately 45 minutes. The entire element then pulled back 500 me-
ters from the contact area to meet safety requirements for a heavy air-strike
mission, and to erect a defensive perimeter. After the air-strikes were com-
pleted and the artillery fire was lifted, the Battalion again moved into a
tactical formation with Alpha and Charlie on line and Bravo and Recon holding
flank responsibility, and moved once again into the area of contact. After
succesfully penetrating the area with no results, the entire element began
its return movement when it again received heavy RPG and automatic weapons
fire from the front and flank. Our elments maintained contact for approxi-
mately thirty (30) minutes and again erected a defensive perimeter 500 meters
from the contact area. From this position, medical evacuations were attended
to as air-strikes and indirect fires were adjusted onto target. When all “dust-
offs” were complete, the Battalion relocated to its logger position just south-
west of the Ben Cui hard-stand.
On the third day, the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry moved northwest of Dau
Tieng into the Crescent areas to report findings on a recent B52 strike. The
Battalion again moved in a “box-type” formation utilizing Alpha and Bravo in
the lead, with Charlie and Recon trailing. The Battalion moved through the ob-
jective area with negative findings, and continued on a northerly direction.
After clearing the target area by approximately one kilometer, the forward el-
ements began to receive heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire supplemented by
60 millimeter mortar fire. The elements adjusted formation to a complete line
with one platoon of Bravo Company acting as rear security, and maintained con-
tact for approximately forty-five (45) minutes utilizing indirect fire support
from Dau Tieng. After breaking contact, the Battalion regrouped and pulled
back to a defensive position where medical evaucations were attended to and air-
strikes were directed on target. Once all “dust-offs” were completed, the Bat-
talion relocated to a night lagger position just west of Ben Cui Arrowhead.
AVDCTV-B 5 June 1969
SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report (Con't)
12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Medevac statistics were compiled at the Battal-
ion Aid Station and diseminated to the Company level. Combat awards were for-
warded through the Company awards clerk to higher headquarters.
13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Navigation due to the extreme thick-
ness of terrain was handled principally from the air. The formations utilized
allowed for rapid supporting movement to counter the many danger areas common
to the Crescent. During some movement, Air Force “spotter planes” were utilized,
allowing for additional assistance in the area of air observation and also pro-
ducing a situation where-by air strikes could be ordered more quickly.
14. COMMANDER's ANALYSIS: Of primary importance during a Battalion size oper-
ation is a highly functional system of communication with good net procedure.
Also, with reference to missions including Battalion size elements, indirect
fire preparations (both inorganic and organic to the unit) cannot be stressed
enough. Lastly, with attention to movement, especially with joint operations,
caution should be exerted towards well planned and executed moves. Time should
never be placed before proper care in execution in view of importance.
EUGENE J. JOHNSTON